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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002452

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DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER AND DS FOR A/S RJ GRIFFIN, DS
Director Greg Starr, and DS/IP/AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2017
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [ASEC](#) [PTER](#) [MOPS](#) [SO](#)
SUBJECT: SOMALIA -- COUNTRY CLEARANCE REQUEST

REFS: A) RSO emails to DS Dated June 09, 2007 B) NAIROBI

2406 C) MSD Operational Plan for Travel of A/S Frazer to
Baidoa April 07, 2007

Classified by: Political Officer Mitch Benedict, for reasons 1.4 (d)

11. (U) This is an action request. See para 5.

12. (S/NF) As described in current threat assessments, travel of USG personnel into Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu, remains problematic (Ref A). However, attendance by an appropriately high level USG official at the opening of Somalia's National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) is vital to demonstrate USG support for the transitional process and to promote peace and stability in Somalia (Ref B). The policy imperative of attending the opening of the NRC (now likely to be o/a June 30) dictates that such travel be undertaken by the Ambassador or Special Envoy John Yates while addressing prudent risk and through appropriate DS measures. The Ambassador recommends and fully supports travel into Somalia for the purposes and intents described herein, and requests Department approval for USG travel to attend the opening ceremony of the NRC.

13. (S/NF) Travel of U.S. personnel for the NRC opening would be a day trip only. However, the Ambassador supports and also requests that the Department approve the travel of two locally engaged Kenyan national employees (both of whom are ethnic Somalis fluent in the Somalia language) to the NRC to remain for longer periods of time in order to report on progress and developments at the NRC. The Ambassador is fully cognizant of the inherent danger of official USG travel to Mogadishu at this time. However, he has determined that this travel, to participate in the NRC, which will begin o/a June 30 and last for approximately two months, is absolutely vital and essential to the advancement of policy.

14. (S/NF) Ideally such travel should have U.S. military support to address air safety issues. If that is not possible, low profile contract air services may be engaged. On ground security would be addressed through DS mechanisms coupled with tHSB.>jEx/upport te closely with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security - Somalia (UNDSS-Somalia) in Nairobi, and with AMISOM, TFG and Ethiopian elements inside Somalia, to ensure appropriate assistance and support for this proposed travel.

Action Request

¶5. (S/NF) Pending Department approval, it is imperative that appropriate steps be taken and measures implemented by DS to provide requisite security support for such travel to mitigate the threat to an acceptable level of prudent risk. Embassy Nairobi requests that DS deploy agents from Mobile Security Deployments (MSD) to Nairobi ASAP, in order to commence liaison, coordination and operational planning for this proposed travel, and to formulate a comprehensive security plan for Mogadishu travel, paralleling the A/S Frazer trip to Baidoa earlier this year (Ref C).

TDY Support Needed

¶6. (S/NF) A TDY Somalia Coordinator should also be deployed with the MSD team. This position should be continuously staffed on a TDY basis until a permanently assigned officer is identified and sent to Nairobi. This position should be permanently filled ASAP by DS for continued assistance, coordination and continuity of operations in all areas and on all topics dealing with Somalia. The RSO office is already understaffed and does not have the capability to provide full time support for Somalia operations.

Threat Assessment and Security Plan

¶7. (S/NF) RSO has previously forwarded, via classified e-mails to DS/IP/AF, the latest threat assessment for proposed travel to Mogadishu at this time, and the UNDSS-

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Somalia security arrangements for the recent day-travel of UN VIP personnel to that location. Both these documents should be referenced by DS in conjunction with this request cable.

RANNEBERGER